to lower birth rates in Europe -economic advantage, industrialization and urbanization, education of women and so onare beginning to have a slight influence in some of the poorer countries. In addition a few large-scale government family planning programmes have recently been initiated. These movements are tending to reduce the high parity births which, in any case, have a heavy mortality. The increased probability of survival of the remaining children will offset the drop in births and may even lead to a net rise in growth rate.
Paradoxically, in the long run it may be an advantage if death rates fall quickly despite the accelerated growth. The pre-requisite for fewer births by voluntary control (although not necessarily an immediate cause) is the conviction of individual parents that a better life will result. In most poor countries the probability that a birth will survive to adult life is still very moderate and the desire for living dependants is a powerful incentive to high fertility. At a recent conference in Nigeria I was impressed by the weight of African opinion on the importance of this cause. I was equally struck by the difficulty of explaining to a woman in the compounds of Ibadan that she should have fewer children because of her country's unfavourable capital-output ratio; the argument (when true) that she could be sure of a grown-up family with only a few births would be more compelling.
The present growth rate has a momentum which (short of atomic catastrophe) makes it certain that thirty years from now the world population will be much larger; the enormous numbers of children combined with the reduced mortality will ensure that there are many more potential parents and that the trend will continue even if there is a substantial fall in fertility. The most optimistic 'low' estimate of the world population in the year 2000 is well over 5,000 million. The extrapolation of present tendencies would give 7,000 million. We are going to be more crowded. It is not the function of this paper to examine the economic implications of the change but I will mention one aspect of the physical and biological difficulties which are perhaps not given enough attention. A feature of the industrial development, which has been found necessary to increase prosperity and indeed maintain standards, has been the more rapid growth of city populations. Rates of 5 % per year and more are frequent. We must expect, therefore, that urban conglomerations of 15-20 million people will become common. Research on animals has shown that crowded living leads to stress which results in aggression, mental breakdown and lower reproduction. There have been suggestions recently that human beings may be similarly affected. The argument from animals in restricted environments to people in cities is, I think, tenuous, but complex influences are certainly operating; there are, in any case, other drawbacks to living in huge cities of which we are all aware. Is this the kind of future we want to drive blindly towards and if not should we not try to control population growth through the kinds of effort by which we have learnedpartially but effectivelyto control mortality ?
The Economics of Population In the decade 1950-60, the world population increased by about a fifthan increase of nearly 500 million. The number of people added to the world's population was approximately equal to the total population of the world in the middle of the seventeenth century. The rate of growth in these ten years was twice that of the preceding twenty years. In absolute numbers, 60% of this increase in population was in Asia, which gained nearly 300 million people. But the fastest rate of increase, 29 % over the decade, was in middle America. Next was Oceania -26 5 %. The rate of growth of Asia was 21 %. In Northern and Western Europe, the rate of increase was only 7 %.
There are some who have argued from the experience of Europe and North America that a high rate of population increase is favourable to economic growth. But the circumstances of Europe and North America in the nineteenth or early twentieth century were very different from those of Asia, Africa and Latin America today. In many respects Europe had already achieved by 1800 a higher level of development than many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have achieved so far. We had rich natural resources ripe for development. The possibilities of emigration were much greater than they are today. Moreover, the demographic changes of the underdeveloped areas 'approach or exceed the most rapid ever encountered among the nations with lowest mortality today' (Stolnitz 1956 ). While the low-income countries at least have the advantage of being able to draw upon world knowledge of technology, they have nevertheless to compete with highly developed countries in world markets. Moreover, the existence of world knowledge coupled with the 'revolution ofrising expectations' imposes financial burdens on the governments of low-income countries which did not face the governments of early nineteenth century Europe and North America. There are pressures to spend Section ofEpidemiology andPreventive Medicine 645 limited resources on curative and supportive medicine and on traditional education which do not give the highest yields in economic growth or in social development.
On the whole, I believe that the circumstances facing the low-income world are much too different from those facing us when we were experiencing rapid population growth for any principle to be derived which can be applied to other cultures at other times. I suspect, and here Japan is an example, that a certain level of basic development has to be achieved before rapid growth in wealth and population can occur simultaneously. But it may be argued that, while population expansion may not help and may even hinder economic expansion, the factors which have caused the growth of population may also be favourable to production. Thus, for example, the eradication of malaria not only sharply reduces mortality; it also reduces morbidity and opens up fertile areas to be cultivated more effectively by less manpower. The economic gain is, however, unlikely to be great unless there is additional work available to use the extra manpower. Unfortunately this is not always the case in the countries concerned. The benefits of reduced morbidity may thus take the form of increased leisure rather than higher output. Moreover, while reductions in morbidity increase once and for all potential economic activity, the effects of a reduction in mortality, as Malthus noted, are cumulative and continuous unless for any reason there should be a drop in the birth rate.
Since the war, there have been enormous improvements in the traditional crude indicators of health in low-income countries. What do the economic indicators show? Although it is not possible to isolate precisely the consequences of population growth on the economics of lowincome countries, the experience of the past decade does not suggest that population growth has been other than unfavourable to development (United Nations 1963). In terms of national income per head, the poorest countries, where the expectation of life has increased so rapidly, have been growing at the slowest rate. Some have not been growing at all. There are even countries where the official statistics (and the latter tend to err on the side of optimism) indicate declines in national income per head. Between 1945 and 1955, there was an annual rate of growth of national income per head in Latin America of 2f7 %. After 1955, it dropped to 1 %. Moreover, food production was barely keeping pace with the population increase. In much of Asia there has been only a small growth of national income per head. In many countries of Africa, real income has been static or declining in recent years. Moreover, countries which recorded large increases in gross national product in 1950 were recording much smaller increases by the late 1950s. The rate of growth in the Congo was 6-I % in 1950 but 0-8 per cent in 1958, in Morocco 5 -3 % in 1951 but 1 *4 % in 1958, in Tunisia 4 % in 1950 but 0-8% in 1958. During the 1950s, the population of Morocco was growing at about 3 % per year and of Tunisia at nearly 2 % per year. How far was the slackening rate of growth due to political changes? How far to the pressure of population? I think it would be wrong to exclude the latter.
Average figures, however, conceal the truth about the majority of the populations in these countries. Those who benefit from rising national income tend to be the wage-earning sector of the population, those who live in towns and cities, and particularly the small minority of landowners, senior civil servants and professional people. In some countries, even the wage-earners do not benefit in real terms from economic growth. Enormous inequality is to be found in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. In Africa not only are there wide differences between African and non-African incomes, but also between different groups of Africans. Moreover, these differences tend to be widening. The ratio of the average non-African to the average African income was about 30 to 1 in Kenya in 1957, 40 to 1 in the Central African Federation in 1956 and 70 to 1 in the former Belgian Congo in 1957. Rarely do rural populations engaged in subsistence agriculture benefit from the recorded economic growth of their countries. On the other hand, they frequently pay a share of the cost of development in the form of the regressive indirect taxes which are such a common feature of these economies. Moreover, to a considerable extent they experience the effects, both favourable and unfavourable, of improvements in health conditions. Fewer still-births, lower maternal mortality, infant mortality and child mortality create more dependants for each economically active person to support. In Latin America as a whole there were in 1960 about 84 dependants (persons under 15 and over 65) to each 100 persons of working age. This involved very heavy burdens for each breadwinner.
The countries which are most aware of their population problems are those which are already heavily populated. Additional land can be brought into cultivation but only at a continually increasing cost, particularly when dependent upon irrigation schemes. Leaving aside external aid, it costs more and more to try to limit the incidence of famine in India and Pakistan as the population increases. In general, the Asian countries have failed to increase their food supplies fast enough to meet their needs. There is widespread unem-ployment and under-employment. The population has grown in an already crowded countryside: there has been an insufficient growth of jobs in country, town and city to absorb the surplus. Nor is unemployment confined to the uneducated. In India there were in 1960 about one million educated persons who were without jobs. Thus those who have work have to support not only the increased number of their dependent children but also children and other relatives of working age who are out of work.
Population increase does not, however, pose economic problems only for countries which are already heavily populated. Even in mainland Africa and Latin America, which have no shortage of cultivable land, population growth involves heavy economic burdens for the poorest countries. For families there is the growing burden of dependent childrendependent for longer periods where education is expanding. For governments there are the problems of finding the money to expand educational facilities, to finance the infrastructure of development in areas which are being opened up, to provide some minimum of health services, and to train the personnel needed to staff the expanded services needed by the higher population expected in the future. Governments are under strong pressure to spend money on the extension of services which will make little or no impact on economic growth and to expand production rather than increase productivity. The demographic structure of what are optimistically called the developing countries is such that the number of children annually reaching school age, the number of young people looking for their first jobs and the number of families seeking homes increase even more rapidly than the total population. The budgets of low-income countries and thus the taxes, which often fall heavily on the poor, have to increase proportionately to prevent existing deficiencies from growing. Thus population growth imposes double burdens on the breadwinner. He must feed his own growing family and pay more taxes for more services to care for the growing population.
There are thus strong theoretical reasons for believing that population growth is both unfavourable to the economic development of lowincome countries and unfavourable to the levels of living of individuals, by burdening them with larger numbers of dependants than they can maintain. As yet, however, we lack adequate empirical investigations from which the precise effects of population growth can be ascertained. There are isolated studies which indicate that better health can contribute to higher output. Only rarely can better health be achieved without generating effects on mortality and thus on the population structure. In the long term, the economic consequences of these demographic changes are likely to be unfavourable to the health of the majority of the population. The only way in which these consequences can be avoided is by securing a reduction in the birth rate.
Sir Theodore Fox (FamilyPlanning Association, London)
Family Planning and the World Emergency
Because I work for the Family Planning Association, I might be expected to say: 'Introduce family planning everywhere, and the world will live happily ever after.' But Professor J M Stycos, director of the International Population Programme, regards family planning as a native American and British product, by no means always suitable for export. And I believe he is right.
Family planning is quite a different concept from population control. It is a service to individuals, based on the idea that people should be able to choose how many children to have and when to have them. FPA doctors are at least as pleased when they can help a subfertile couple to have a much-wanted baby as they are to stop a fertile couple having an unwanted one.
Again, whereas formerly our clinics were places where women went to have a cap fittedto have a technical service performedthey are now becoming places where people can get a medical consultation about their fertility and its control. Until the National Health Service can take over this important part of preventive (and occasionally curative) medicine, the FPA with its 500 clinics is providing what is really a supplementary medical service. Whereas the corresponding body in the United States, Planning Parenthood, is trying to persuade Americans to be less prolific, the FPA has not so far expressed any concern with whether the population goes up or goes down. Its object has been solely to help people as individuals.
This does not mean that family planning is not doing anything to solve the population problem in this country; for it is. Indeed, if we were vompletely successful and managed to prevent all unintended pregnancies, this might go far to give Britain a stable population again. Though the present natural increasethe excess of births over deathsis sufficient, if continued, to destroy most of the things that make this island a good
